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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are amongthe nation’s leading organizations
representing people with disabilities. Mostare governedand
staffed by a majority of people with disabilities of all types.
Theyplayed a key role in enacting the nation’s civil rights
laws for people with disabilities, including the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12181.Based on
their shared experience as people with disabilities, including
conditions judged to be "terminal," Amici strongly oppose
the legalization of assisted suicide.:
In the United States, as in most other nations, a
person who attempts or desires to commit suicide will
typically be rushed to the nearest emergencyroom, as onehalf million Americans are each year. The Surgeon
General’s Call to Action to Prevent Suicide 1999 1. The
person will be subject to numerous laws, programs, and
medical and therapeutic interventions designed to convince
him or her not to commitsuicide, or to prevent him or her
from doing so. Id.
It seemsaxiomatic that society’s response to a person
whoattempts suicide should not differ based on that person’s
race, ethnicity, gender, religion or disability. Yet Oregon’s
"Death with Dignity" Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800 127.995, encourages, rather than discourages, certain people
to die solely because of their disability. Indeed, the law
guarantees that the suicide attempts of the severely disabled
will succeed. Although the SurgeonGeneral has stated that
suicide prevention policies "must recognize and affirm the
value, dignity and importance of each person," Surgeon
General’s Call to Action at 13, Oregon’sassisted suicide law
implicitly states that somepeople’s lives are worth saving
Theparties haveconsentedto the filing of this brief. No
counselfor a partyhas authoredthis brief, in wholeor in part, andno
person other than amici and their counsel has madeany monetary
contribution
for its preparation.

2
and others are not. For amici, this debate is not about the
"choice" of someonewhois suicidal. Rather, it is about
demandinga uniform legal and societal response to those
whowant to kill themselves. Amici’s experience as people
with disabilities is that the false assumptionthat suicide is a
rational solution to the barriers and discrimination they face
devalues them as humanbeings and sanctions their unequal
treatment under law.
Supporters of physician-assisted suicide laws such as
Oregon’s claim they are limited only to competent people
whoface imminentdeath as a result of terminal illness. Yet
neither Oregon’s system of physician-assisted suicide nor
any other - whether de jure (the Netherlands)2 or de facto
(Dr. Kevorkian)3 - has operated within these boundaries.
Physician-assisted suicide invites anyone involved in the
decision to die, including the physician, to make
monumentaljudgments on the relative value of a person’s
life - or, as one Oregon reporter noted, to act as "the
gatekeepers of death." Evelyn Hoover Barnett, Is Morn
Capable of Choosingto Die? The Oregonian, Oct. 16, 1999,
at G1. It is no coincidence, then, that this Court has refused
to recognize assisted suicide as a fundamental right, see
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997), the
medical profession has eschewedit as a legitimate practice,
see AmericanMedical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211,
and every other state besides Oregonhas refused to allow it
shelter under their laws, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. And,
as Amici here submit, it is condemned
by the vast majority of
people with disabilities. See National Council on Disability,
Assisted Suicide: A Disability Perspective (1997, re-released
2005).
2 See Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and
the Dutch Cure (1997), cited in Washingtonv. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
730 (1997).
3 See Loft A. Roscoe et al., Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Cases of
Euthanasia m Oakland County, Michigan, 1990-1998, 343 NewEng. J.
Med.1735 (Dec. 7, 2000).

A.

Not Dead Yet

Not DeadYet is a national grassroots organization of
people with disabilities formedin response to the movement
to permit physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in the
United States and around the world. Not Dead Yet’s mission
is to protect the civil rights of people with disabilities by
advocating against discriminatory legalization of physicianassisted suicide and euthanasia and to bring a disabilityrights perspective and awareness of the effects of
discrimination to the legal and sociological debate
surrounding these practices. Not Dead Yet has worked to
educate, support, coordinate and lead the disability
community’seffort to stop the "right to die" from becominga
duty to die or a right to kill. This Court cited NotDeadYet’s
amicus brief in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
733 n.23 (1997). Not DeadYet has also testified before the
U.S. Congress three times on the subject of physicianassisted suicide.
B.

ADAPT

ADAPT
is a national disability rights organization
comprised primarily of people with disabilities. ADAPT
has
a long history and record of enforcing the civil rights of
people with disabilities. In addition to being one of the key
organizations that helped enact the Americans with
Disabilities Act, ADAPT
has been a plaintiff in numerous
civil rights lawsuits. See e.g. ADAPT
v. Skinner, 881 F.2d
1184 (3d Cir. 1989); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Secretary of Publ. Welf v. IdeI1
S., 516 U.S. 813 (1995); ADAPTv. Philadelphia Hous.
Auth., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS5380 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2000);
ADAPTv.SkyWestAirlines, 762 F. Supp. 320 (D. Ut. 1991).

Center on Disability Studies, Lawand Human
Policy at SyracuseUniversity
The Center on Disability Studies, Law and Human
Policy is an interdisciplinary disability research and policy
institute at Syracuse University. Established in 1971, the
Center’s workfocuses on people with cognitive disabilities.
The Center’s research has included studies of institutions,
schools, and communityservices, the history of the treatment
of people with disabilities in America, disability law and
policy, imagesof disability in the mediaand popular culture,
and the politics and ethics of treatment.
D.

Center for Self-Determination

The Center for Self-Determination is a national
organization comprised of individuals with disabilities,
family members, and professionals
committed to the
principles of self-determination: freedom to choose where
and with whomone wants to live, as well as what one will
do with one’s life; authority and control over the dollars
necessary for long term supports; designing and providing
individual, community-based supports for people with
disabilities; and responsibility for both the wise use of public
dollars and for contributing to one’s community.
E.

Hospice Patients Alliance

The Hospice Patients Alliance, Inc. is a charitable
nonprofit patient advocacy organization that works to
promote excellence in end-of-life care and to protect the
rights of patients. It provides information about hospice
services, directly assists patients, families and caregivers in
resolving difficulties they have with current hospice services,
and promotesbetter quality hospice care.

5
F.

MouthMagazine/Freedom Clearinghouse

MouthMagazine, published by Free HandPress, Inc.,
is a magazine run by and dedicated to issues concerning
people with disabilities. Its mission is to promotethe lives
and freedoms of all people with disabilities
through
magazines, books, handbooks, speeches, pamphlets, and
electronic media. The mission statement of Freedom
Clearinghouse is to publicize and implement the right of
people with disabilities to live in the community.
G.

National Council on Independent Living

The National Council on Independent Living (NCIL)
represents over 700 advocacy organizations and people with
disabilities of all types. Theindependentliving philosophy,
which NCILand its members advance, holds that people
with disabilities have the right to live with dignity and
appropriate supports in their ownhomes,participate in their
communities, and control and make decisions about their
lives, regardlessof the degreeof disability.
H.

National Spinal CordIniury Association

Founded in 1948, the National Spinal Cord Injury
Association (NSCIA)is the largest organization in the
United States dedicated to improvingthe quality of life of
persons with spinal cord injuries and diseases. The NSCIA’s
mission is to enable people with spinal cord injuries to make
choices and take actions to achieve their highest level of
independence and personal fulfillment. Spinal cord injury
has been cited as the type of impairmentwarranting a desire
to hasten death. The NSCIAbelieves that expediting one’s
death because they have a disability is immoraland unwise,
both for society at large and membersof the disability
communityin particular.
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I.

Self-Advocates

Becoming Empowered

Self-Advocates Becoming Empoweredis a national
organization comprised of and directed by people with
developmentaldisabilities, including intellectual disabilities
or mental retardation, cerebral palsy and autism. First
established in 1974, Self-Advocates Becoming Empowered
nowhas over 900 chapters in 46 states (knownlocally as
"People First" organizations), with an estimated 20,000
members.
Many members have been unnecessarily
institutionalized and have experienced discrimination by
medicalpractitioners.
J.

Society for Disability Studies

TheSociety for Disability Studies is an intemational
non-profit organization that promotes the exploration of
disability throughresearch, artistic production,and teaching.
K.

TASH

TASH(formerly the Association for Persons with
Severe Handicaps) is an intemational advocacy organization
of people with disabilities, their families, advocates and
professionals in the disability field. It has over 30 chapters
covering 37 states and membersin 34 nations. TASHhas
4adopted a resolution opposingphysician-assisted suicide.
L.

WorldInstitute on Disability

The World Institute
on Disability (WID) is
nonprofit research, public policy and advocacy center
dedicated to promoting the civil rights and full societal
inclusion of people with disabilities. WIDis govel-ned and
staffed by a majorityof peoplewith disabilities.
4 www.tash.org/resolutions/res02assistedsuicide.htm.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici support the Attomey General’s interpretive
ruling that assisted suicide is not a "legitimate medical
practice" under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
801-971, and its implementing regulations, 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a). Whenapplied only to people with significant
even "terminal" health impairments, Oregon’s assisted
suicide law encouragesthe disabled to end their lives - and
guarantees such efforts will be successful - while other state
laws concurrently discourage non-disabled persons from
doing so. Assisted suicide laws deny people with disabilities
the benefit of programsand laws that prevent suicide and are
the ultimate legal judgmentthat the life of a person with a
disability is not as worthwhile as that of a non-disabled
person.
Assisted suicide also raises serious ethical concerns
regarding the medicalprofession’s treatment of the disabled.
It requires doctors to makedifficult, if not impossible,
determinations
of a person’s competency and life
expectancy, the consequencesof which are both ultimate and
irreversible. Theavailability of assisted suicide also distracts
from the determination whether a person’s desire to die
might be lifted with improved treatment, community-based
health care or other measures that improve a person’s
independenceand dignity.
Thus, given the Attorney General’s latitude to
interpret federal statutes that Congresshas authorized himto
enforce, see Chevron U.S.A.v. Natural Resources Defense
Council 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1982), this difference
treatment, based solely on the presence of a severe disability,
justifies the Attorney General’s action here. Additionally,
Congress and the Attomey General are not precluded from
acting to protect the rights of people with disabilities simply
because such protection regulates the practice of medicine.
The Court of Appeals’ erroneous reliance on Gregory v.

Ashcrofi, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), and its imposition of the
"clear statement" rule to an area that is not a "fundamental"
state function, unduly impairs Congress’ability to legislate
against state infringementson the civil rights of people with
disabilities,
ARGUMENT
Assisted Suicide Serves No Legitimate Medical
Purpose Because It Discriminates Against and
Degradesthe Lives of People with Disabilities
Laws, Programsand Services Operate to
Prevent People from CommittingSuicide
Suicide is a practice that American society
disapproves of and actively discourages through laws and
prevention programs. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 711 (1997) ("[F]or over 700 years, the Anglo-American
common-law tradition
has punished or otherwise
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide."). The
U.S. Surgeon General has called suicide "a serious health
problem." The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Prevent
Suicide 1999 at 1. Every year, 500,000 people in the United
States use emergencyroom services as a result of suicide
attempts, ld. In almost every state, helping someone
commitsuicide is a crime. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-11.
In Oregon,intentionally causing or aiding another person to
commit suicide is second-degree manslaughter. Or. Rev.
Stat. § 163.125. Oregonlaw also authorizes physical force
to prevent someonefrom committing suicide. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 161.205(4).5 Additionally, manystates statutorily mandate

5 See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-403; Del. CodeAnn.tit.

11, §

467; 9 GuamCode Ann. § 7.92; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703.308; Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28.1412; N.H. Rev. Star. Ann. § 627.6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:3-7;
N.D. Cent. Code§ 12.1-05; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 508; Tenn. CodeAnn. §
39-11-613;Wis. Stat. § 939.48.

suicide prevention plans,
6programs.

hotlines,

or other intervention

According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
depression and anxiety are often associated with suicide and
over 80 percent of suicide victims had severe depression.
WHO,Worm Report on Violence and Health 192 (2002).
Oregon law reflects
this assumption that persons who
commit suicide do not act rationally.
For life insurance
purposes, Oregon law creates a presumption against suicide,
under the reasoning that "it is commonknowledge that sane
persons do not ordinarily
kill themselves." Wyckoff v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 147 P.2d 227, 229 (Or. 1944); see also
Or. Rev. Stat. § 656.310 (for worker’s compensation claims,
worker’s death presumed not to be suicide). Oregon also
presumes that the will of one whocommits suicide is invalid
and the product of a "deranged" mind. In re Kober’s Will,
7285 P. 1032 (Or. 1930).

6 See e.g. AlaskaStat. S§ 44.29.300-44.29.390;
Ariz. Rev.Stat.
§ 36.3415; Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-1005; Cal. Gov. Code § 53110;
Cal.Welf. & Inst. Code§§ 4098- 4098.5; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-294g;
410 Ill. Comp.Stat. 53/5-15; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 17.282.4; Md.Code
Ann., Health-General§ 10-1403(a)(1)(iii); Mass.Ann.Lawsch.
36C;Minn.Stat. § 146.56;Mo.Rev.Stat. § 630.900;Nev.Rev.Stat. §§
439.511-439.513;N.H.Rev. Stat. § 186.67-a;N.J. Stat. Ann.§§ 30:9A13 - 30:9A-27;N.D.Cent. Code§ 57-40.6-10; Okla. Stat. Ann.§§ 12101 - 12-105;24 P.R. LawsAnn.§§ 3241- 3244; R.I. Gen. Laws§ 1622-14;Va. CodeAnn.§ 32.1-73.7.
v Other waysin whichOregonlaw discouragessuicide include:
the exclusion of suicide threats from a state law mandating
confidentiality of statementsmadeduringcounselingsessions, Or. Rev.
Stat. § 181.860(8)(a);establishinga statewideteamto investigate youth
suicides, Or. Rev. Stat. § 418.748; establishing a Youth Suicide
Prevention Coordinator,Or. Rev. Stat. § 418.756;and mandatingthat
hospitals refer children whoattempt suicide to crisis intervention
services, Or. Rev.Star. § 441.750.
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The OregonAssisted Suicide LawDenies
Peoplewith Disabilities the Benefits of Suicide
Prevention Laws and Measures
The Oregon"Death with Dignity" Act, Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 127.800 - 127.995, modifies the assumption that suicide
is irrational and undesirable - but only as to persons with
"terminal" disabilities or conditions. For these people,
Oregonlaw does not assume that suicide is irrational or a
practice that should be discouraged. Rather, the law allows
doctors and others to facilitate suicide, an act that wouldbe a
crime but for the person’s disability. Persons with severe
health impairments are therefore denied the benefit of
suicide prevention laws and programs. Indeed, state law
guarantees their suicide attempts will succeed - unlike those
of other persons with suicidal ideations. Apractice that the
State would otherwise expend public health resources to
prevent is instead allowed to occur. This differing response
8is basedsolely on a person’sdisability.
If a state overtly excluded people with "terminal"
disabilities from suicide prevention laws and programs, it
wouldundoubtedlyviolate federal civil rights laws such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132,
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
794(a). Yet that is precisely the design and effect of the
Oregon assisted-suicide law. A more devastating form of
discrimination would be difficult to imagine. By assuming
that it is irrational for a non-disabledpersonto end his or her
life, but rational for a disabled person to do so, the law
assumesthat the non-disabled person’s life is intrinsically
morevaluable and worthwhilethan that of a disabled person.
8 Amici do not advocate here for forced treatment or against the
right of people with disabilities to refuse treatment. Amici include
persons with psychiatric disabilities whohave been subject to unwanted
treatment. Amici are concerned solely with the Oregonassisted suicide
law’s unequal treatment of the disabled. See www.mindfreedom.com.
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For amici, perhaps no other attitude strikes closer to
the heart of the disability civil rights movementto which
they have dedicated themselves for the past three decades.
Central to this movementis the idea that a disabling
condition does not inherently diminish one’s life; rather,
surrounding barriers and prejudices do so. Assisted suicide
takes the opposite approach- it gives official sanction to the
9idea that life with a disabling condition is not worthliving.
As this Court has recognized:
The State’s interest here [in prohibiting
assisted suicide] goes beyondprotecting the
vulnerable from coercion; it extends to
protecting disabled and terminally ill people
from prejudice, negative and inaccurate
stereotypes, and "societal indifference ..."
The State’s assisted-suicide ban reflects and
reinforces its policy that the lives of
terminally ill, disabled and elderly people
must be no less valued than the lives of the
young and healthy, and that a seriously
disabled person’s suicidal impulses should be
interpreted and treated the sameas everyone
else’s.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
Co

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Are Part of
the Longand Tragic History of Discrimination
Against People with Disabilities

Assisted suicide must be seen against the background
of the United States’ long and tragic history of state9 See Carol J. Gill, Suicidal Intervention for People with
Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 Issues in L. &Med.37 (1992)
("Whena culture values humanlife conditionally, suicide intervention
becomes selective. Devalued populations fail to receive rigorous
protection, assessment and treatment.")
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sanctioned discrimination against the disabled, which five
members of the Supreme Court have called "grotesque."
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
454-55& 461 (1985). Amici’s experience is that this history
continues to haunt the everydaylives and realities of people
with disabilities, particularly whenmakingso-called "endof-life" decisions.
Throughouthistory, state officials, with the support
of the medical community,have authorized the sterilization
of people with disabilities. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927)("It is better for all the world,if ... society can prevent
those whoare manifestly unfit from continuing their kind ...
1,,’x
Three generations of imbeciles are enough
).l0 People with
disabilities wereplaced in "massivecustodial institutions ...
built to warehousethe retarded for life; the aim was to halt
reproduction of the retarded and ’nearly extinguish their
race.’" City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461-62 (Marshall, J.,
concurring & dissenting) (citations omitted). The disabled
were deemed "uneducable" and excluded en masse from
public schools. See School Comm. of Burlington v.
Massachusetts Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373 (1985).
These practices, like Jim Crow laws in the south, were
carried out by elected officials with the support of the voters.
This did not make them any more legitimate
or
constitutional.
Euthanasia played a key role in this history. In the
1940s, medical professionals
sought the involuntary
euthanasia of the severely disabled. In a 1941 presentation
to the American Psychiatric Association, which was later
1o See also In re Simpson, 180 N.E. 2d 206 (Ct. Common
Pleas
Oh. 1962) (ordering sterilization of womanwith retardation because
"probability that [her] offspring will be mentally deficient and becomea
public charge for most of their lives.");
H. Laughlin, Eugenic
Sterilization in the United States 369 (1922) ("[D]efectives who
practically certain to breed principally defectives, owe a debt to the
communitythat can be discharged only by an adequate guarantee that
they shall not contribute to the next generation.").
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published in the Association’s journal, Dr. Foster Kennedy,
the President of the American Neurological Association,
stated:
[T]heplace for euthanasia,I believe, is for the
completely hopeless defective: nature’s
mistake; something we hustle out of sight,
which should never have been seen at all.
These should be relieved of the burden of
living ... to allow them to continue such a
living is sheer sentimentality, and cruel too;
we deny them as muchsolace as we give our
stricken horse. Here wemaymost kindly kill.
M. Louis Often, Dealing with "Defectives":
Foster
Kennedy and William Lenox on Eugenics, 61 Neurology 668
(Sept. 2003) (quoting Foster Kennedy, The Problem of
Social Control of the Congenital Defective, 99 Am. J.
Psychiatry 13, 16 (1942)). In 1935, a Nobel Prize-winning
fellow at the Rockefeller Institute similarly urged that
"sentimental prejudice ... not obstruct the quiet and painless
disposition of incurable ... and hopeless lunatics." The Right
to Kill, II
Time,Nov.18, 1935, at 53-54.
Such attitudes, unfortunately, are not completely in
the past. Prominent ethicists such as Peter Singer of
Princeton University have sanctioned the killing of infants
with severe disabilities based on a belief that they will not
lead a "good"life and will burden their parents and society.
Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death." The Collapse of
Our Traditional Ethics 197-98 (1994). Professor Singer has
also written that it is impossible to kill people with severe
cognitive disabilities "against their will" "because they are
not capableof havinga will on such a matter." ld.

r l See also Robert J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing
and the Psychology of Genocide (1986).
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Amici do not claim that Oregon’sassisted suicide law
was intended to "extinguish" the disabled. Nevertheless,
given this history and the slippery slope it exemplifies,
federal safeguards are appropriate and necessary to ensure
that euthanasia against the disabled is not, once again,
sanctioned as a "legitimate medicalpractice" as it wasfor so
manyyears.
Assisted Suicide ContravenesMedical Ethics
and Practice Becauseof the AbuseIt Poses to
People with Disabilities

Do

As this Court has recognized, assisted suicide is
contrary to well-established medical ethics. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 731 (quoting AmericanMedical Association, Code of
Ethics § 2.211 (1994)); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793, 801 n.6 (1997) (discussing medical profession’s
distinction between withholding treatment and assisted
suicide). This rejection is firmly groundedin the potential
harmthe Oregonassisted suicide law poses to the lives of
peoplewith disabilities.
1.

The Uncertainty
"TerminalIllness"

of Diagnosing

a

First, the diagnosis and prognosis of a "terminal
condition" - defined under the Oregon law as a condition
likely to cause death within the next six months - is
inherently uncertain. Timothy E. Quill et al., Sounding
Board." Care of the Hopelessly Ill, 327 NewEng. J. Med.
1380, 1381 (Nov. 5, 1992) ("[W]e acknowledge
inexactness of such prognosis [of imminent death]").
Oregon’s ownreports on the implementation of its assisted
suicide law confirm this uncertainty. In 2004, 60 patients
were determined "terminally ill" and prescribed lethal
medication, but only 35 ingested the medication. Of the 25
whodid not, 12 - almost half- were still alive at the end of
2004. One patient whowas prescribed medication in 2003,
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and thus determinedto have less than six monthsto live, did
not ingest the medicationand was nevertheless still alive by
the end of 2004. Oregon Department of HumanServices,
Seventh Annual Report on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act
12 (2005).
Assisted suicide has not been limited to persons
facing imminent death. In the Netherlands, whose assisted
suicide law was a model for Oregon, a governmental report
confirmed that manypeople have been killed who did not
have a "terminal" illness. Peter Van der Maas et al.,
Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the
End of Life, 338 The Lancet 669, 672 (1991). 12 Similarly,
only one in four of the people whomDr. Jack Kevorkian
helped commitsuicide had a terminal illness; others simply
had physical or neurological disabilities. Lori A. Roscoeet
al., Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Cases of Euthanasia in Oakland
County, Michigan, 1990-1998, 343 NewEng. J. Med. 1735,
1736(Dec. 7, 2000).
The medical profession’s
predictions
of the
capabilities and life spans of people with disabilities have
been historically unreliable. As the National Council on
Disability has reported, "peoplewith disabilities are awareof
enough instances of dramatic mistakes that manyof them
have a healthy skepticism of medical predictions,
particularly as it relates to future life quality." Assisted
Suicide: A Disability Perspective at 27-28. Evan Kemp,
Director of the Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission
under President George H.W.Bush, wrote:

~2 Not all such cases involve unintentional misdiagnosis. In one
Dutch case, a court acquitted a psychiatrist whohelped a physically
healthy 50-year old woman- whowas unquestionably not terminally ill
- commit suicide. The womanhad been diagnosed with leukemia and
had a history of depression. Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death:
Doctors, Patients andthe Dutch Cure, 10 Issues in L. &Med. 123, 12326 (1994).
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As a disabled person, I am especially
sensitive to the "quality of life" rationale that
is frequently introduced in the debate [over
assisted suicide]. For the past 47 years I have
lived with a progressive neuromuscular
disease that first beganto manifest itself when
I was 12. Mydisease, Kugelberg Weylander
Syndrome, has no knowncure, and I have no
hope for "recovery." Upon diagnosis, my
parents were informed by the physicians
treating methat I woulddie within two years.
Later, another group of physicians was certain
that I would live only to the age of 18. Yet
here I am at 59, continuing to have an
extraordinarily high quality of life.
Evan J. Kemp, Could You Please Die Now? Wash. Post,
Jan. 5, 1997,at C 1.
o

The Law’s False Assumption that Suicide
is "Rational" When Committed by a
Personwith a Disability

As the Glucksberg Court recognized, "those who
attempt suicide - terminally ill or not - often suffer from
~3
depression or other mental disorders." 521 U.S. at 730.
The Court continued, "Research indicates ... that many
people whorequest physician-assisted suicide withdrawthat
request if their depression and pain are treated." Id. For
example, a study of cancer patients showedthat those with
depression were four times more likely to want to die.
William Breitbart et al., Depression, Hopelessness and
Desire for Hastened Death in Terminally Ill Patients with
Cancer, 284 JAMA
2907, 2909 (Dec. 13, 2000).
13 Ninety-five percent of those whocommitsuicide have been
found to have a diagnosable psychiatric illness in the months preceding
suicide. Herbert Hendin et aL, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Dangers
of Legalization, 150 Am.J. Psychiatry 14 (Jan. 1993).
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Although the Oregonlaw mandates that doctors must
determine that patients are "not suffering from a psychiatric
or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired
judgment" before prescribing lethal drugs, and must refer
such patients for counseling, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.825, in
practice such determinations are extremely problematic. In a
survey of Oregonpsychiatrists, over half were "not at all
confident" they could assess in a single consultation whether
a psychiatric condition impaired a person’s judgment; only
six percent were "very confident." Linda Ganzini et al.,
Evaluation of Competenceto Consent to Assisted Suicide:
Views of Forensic Psychiatrists, 157 Am.J. Psychiatry 595
(Apr. 2000). This is because such assessments are inherently
subjective and unreliable.
As one research analysis
concluded:
There is a marked lack of clarity about the
goals of mandatorypsychiatric assessment in
all patients requesting PAS [physicianassisted suicide]. Moreworryingly, there are
no clinical
criteria
to guide such an
assessment -just as there are no criteria to
assess the rationality of any person’s decision
to commitsuicide.
Brendan D. Kelly et al., Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and
Psychiatry: A Pandora’sBox, 181 British J. Psychiatry 278,
279 (2002).
Perhaps for these reasons, counseling referrals in
assisted suicide cases under the Oregonlaw are alarmingly
rare. In 2004, only five percent of patients seeking assisted
suicide were referred for a psychiatric evaluation. Seventh
AnnualReport on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act at 24. In
the Netherlands, whoseassisted suicide law similarly asks
doctors to determine whether a person’s judgment is
impaired by a psychiatric disability, only three percent of
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assisted suicide patients
278.
3.

were so referred.

Kelly, supra at

The Law’s False
Assumption
that
Disability Intrinsically
Deprives Life of
Dignity and Value

Many people identified
as candidates for assisted
suicide could benefit from supportive care or treatment, such
as counseling,
pain medication,
or in-home personal
assistance. These measures lessen their pain and suffering,
their perceived burden on family members, or their lack of
independence
and choice.
The National
Council on
Disability
has found that "improving laws, policies,
programs and services for people with disabilities ... would
go a long way toward assuring that any self-assessment or
decision about the quality of life of an individual with a
disability
would be made in an optimal context of
independence, equality of opportunity, full participation, and
empowerment." Assisted Suicide: A Disability Perspective
atl3.
Research demonstrates the lack of this type of
assistance and support, rather than any intrinsic aspect of a
person’s disability, is the primary motivation for suicide.
For example, one study found that people who experience
serious pain are no more likely to want to kill themselves
than those who do not. This finding was attributed to "the
quality of pain management"provided to terminal patients in
the study. Breitbart, supra at 2910. In a study of euthanasia
in the Netherlands, only ten of 187 patients listed pain as the
reason they wanted to die. Van der Maas, supra at 672.
Depression is also a condition that can be treated with
therapy or counseling, which often leads the patient to
withdraw his or her request to die. Kelly, supra at 279;
Herbert Hendin et at., Physician-Assisted
Suicide." The
Dangers of Legalization, 150 Am. J. Psychiatry 14, 15 (Jan.
1993).
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Assisted suicide, however, assumesthat a disability
or medical condition inherently makes life unworthy of
continuation. Its availability causes medicalpractitioners to
ignore other measures, services and modifications that might
cause someoneto reconsider their desire to die. As a doctor
at NewYork’s MemorialSloan-Kettering Cancer Center has
observed, assisted suicide "runs the risk of further devaluing
the lives of terminally ill patients and may provide the
excuse for society to abrogate its responsibility for their
care." Kathleen M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying
Instead of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 336 NewEng. J. Med.
54 (Jan. 2, 1997).
Thedesire to die of people with disabilities is often
driven by a temporal or situational depression that arises
fromthe perceptionthat their lives lack value or that they are
a burden on their loved ones. In a study of HIVand AIDS
patients, one participant said, "I’m still inconveniencing
other people wholook after meand stuff like that ... No, I’d
rather die." Another described himself as "a bag of potatoes
to be movedfrom spot to spot ..." James V. Lavery et al.,
Origins of the Desire for Euthanasiaand Assisted Suicide in
People with HIV-1 or AIDS: A Qualitative Study, 358 The
14
Lancet 362, 364-64(Aug. 4, 2001).
~4 Oregon’sexperience also confirms these findings. Physicians
who administered assisted suicide under the Oregon law were asked
whether"end of life concerns"contributed to the patient’s desire to die:
In all cases, physicians reported multiple concerns
contributing to the request. Eleven (41%) patients
included at least four specific concerns: becominga
burden, losing autonomy, decreasing ability to
participate in activities that makelife enjoyable, and
losing control of bodily functions. Another 15 (56%)
patients included at least two or three of these
concerns. Mostfrequently noted across all three years
were loss of autonomy... and participation in activities
that makelife enjoyable ... Patients have increasingly
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Anotherstudy linked suicidal ideation to unnecessary
institutionalization. It foundthat mostterminally ill patients
who have a sense of "fractured dignity" were inpatients,
"suggesting that the degree of autonomyand independence
that can be maintained in a home setting with community
based care, as opposedto care enabled by an institution, is an
important mediator of one’s sense of dignity." This loss of
dignity, and the corresponding feelings of depression and
hopelessness, are "strong predictors of desire for death and
suicidal ideation ..." Harvey MaxChochinovet al., Dignity
in the Terminally 1ll" A Cross-Sectional, Cohort Study, 360
The Lancet 2026 (Dec. 28, 2002).
These medical findings mirror this Court’s
recognition of the deleterious effects of institutionalization.
In Olmsteadv. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the Court held that
unjustified institutionalization wasa form of discrimination
under the Americans with Disabilities
Act because it
"perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
communitylife" and "severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations, social
contacts, work options, economicindependence, educational
advancement,and cultural enrichment." Id. at 600.
The question howto address the needs that underlie
the desire to die, however,is typically lost in the wakeof the
law’s "competency" determination.
As one Oregon
psychiatrist stated:
The focus of competence maydistract from
adequate attention and resources on the
expressed concern about becominga burden to family,
friends or caregivers.
Oregon Department of HumanServices, Oregon’s Death with Dignity
Act: Three Years of Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide 11-12 (2001).
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person and their circumstances ... we may
spend thousands of dollars on assessing
competenceand little in care directed to the
day-to-daylife and moraleof the person.
Ganzini, supra at 600. Another study concluded that the
Oregonlaw’s competencydetermination "do[es] not provide
a frameworkto address social circumstances that contribute
to the desire for euthanasia or assisted suicide." Lavery,
supra at 366.
The case of Kenneth Bergstedt exemplifies how
external concerns that could be remedieddrive the desire to
die for people with disabilities. Mr. Bergstedt, a 30-year old
Nevadaman with quadriplegia, wanted to die because his
father, whocared for him, was himself dying of cancer. Mr.
Bergstedt, though not in physical pain, feared he would be
institutionalized without his father’s support. See McKayv.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628, 637 (Nev. 1990); Stanley
Herr, No Place to Go." Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treatment
by CompetentPersons with Physical Disabilities, 8 Issues in
L. & Med.3, 10-13 (1992).
A psychiatric evaluation submitted to the trial court
found that Mr. Bergstedt was depressed, but that this was
irrelevant because "the quality of life for this manis ...
forever profaned by a future whichoffers no relief and only
the possibility of worsening." Herr, supra at 12. Based on
his poor "quality of life," the NevadaSupremeCourt upheld
his decision to die. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 824-25. No
consideration was given to measures that might have helped
Mr. Bergstedt restore his sense of dignity and independence,
such as non-institutional, in-homehealth care.
A dissenting NevadaSupremeCourt Justice observed
that "[w]ith this kind of support it is no wonderthat he
decided to do himself in." Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 637
(Springer, J., dissenting). Headded, presciently:
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It is critical that the court not put its judicial
stamp of approval on negative stereotypes
about disability. This wouldresult if it were
to allow the state to assist an individual to die
only because he or she had a disability.
Judicial decisions whichare based on societal
prejudices merely reinforce those prejudices,
makingthem even moredifficult to eradicate.
Id. at 836.
Becauseit rests on false assumptionsand stereotypes
of the disabled, Oregon’sassisted suicide law enshrines these
debilitating attitudes under the protection of state law.
t

The Difficulty in EnsuringDecisions to Die
Are Not Coerced or MadeBy Others

Finally, evidence exists that some persons killed
under assisted suicide laws may "choose" suicide under
pressure from others. In the case of Kate Cheney,an 85-year
old womanwith cancer, her psychologist was concerned that
Ms. Cheneywas not competent to makethe decision to die
and that her daughter was unduly pressuring her to choose
assisted suicide. The daughter simply obtained an opinion
from a second psychologist, who determined Ms. Cheney
was competent. Ms. Cheney was accordingly prescribed
lethal medication and died on August 29, 1999. Evelyn
Hoover Barnett, Is MornCapable of Choosing to Die? The
Oregonian, Oct. 16, 1999, at G1-2.
A Dutch study
confirmedthat somepeople administered lethal drugs in that
country did not ask to die. Vander Maas,supra at 672.
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II.

The Attorney General’s Determination that
Assisted Suicide is Not a "LegitimateMedical
Practice" is a Permissible Constructionof the
Controlled Substances Act
TheAttorney General’s Interpretive Ruling is
Entitled to Deference

In Chevron U.S.A.v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1982), this Court set forth the
standard under which courts must defer to an Executive
Branchagency’s interpretation of a statute. WhenCongress
has authorized the agency to enforce the statute, the court
must makea twofold inquiry:
First ... whetherCongresshas directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent
of Congressis clear, that is the end of the
matter ... If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction of the
statute, as wouldbe necessary in the absence
of administrative interpretation. Rather, if a
statute is silent or ambiguouswith respect to a
specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissibleconstruction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
The Court clarified that "permissible construction"
was not "the only one [the agency] permissibly could have
adopted ... or even the reading the court wouldhave reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."
Id. at 843n. 11.
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Under this standard, an agency’s interpretative
rulings "are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Id.; see also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002).
Evenwhenthis standard has not been applied, this Court has
nevertheless relied on "the well-reasoned views of the
agencies implementinga statute," which "constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants mayproperly resort for guidance." Bragdonv.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmorev. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)); see also Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581,598 (1999).
Under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
801 - 971, Congress authorized the Attorney General to
register medical practitioners
to dispense controlled
substances, 21 U.S.C. § 822(b), and designated the Attorney
General as the officer responsible for the Act’s enforcement.
21 U.S.C. § 871(a). The Attorney General mayrevoke such
registration if he "determines that the issuance of such
registration wouldbe inconsistent with the public interest."
21 U.S.C. § 823(t"). In making this determination, the
Attorney General mayconsider, amongother factors, "any
conduct which maythreaten the public health and safety."
ld. Although preventing drug abuse is one of Congress’
goals under the Act, its plain languagedoes not limit itself to
that goal; rather, the Act seeks to prohibit any use of
prescription drugs that mayhave a "detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people." 21
U.S.C. § 801(2).
In 1971, the Attorney General promulgated a
regulation under the Act that states that prescriptions for
controlled substances are valid only if issued for a
"legitimate medical purpose" as part of "professional
treatment." 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a). This Court has affirmed
the validity of this regulation. United States v. Moore,423
U.S. 122, 140 (1975).
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Underthis regulation, the Attorney General issued an
interpretive ruling that assisted suicide is not a "legitimate
medical practice" for "treatment" within the meaningof this
regulation, thereby rendering any prescriptions madefor this
purpose invalid. Given the well-documented medical
concerns over the harm and invidious discrimination the
Oregonassisted suicide law poses to people with disabilities,
see Sec. I, supra, the Attorney General’s ruling is
undoubtedlya valid interpretation of the Act, which does not
specifically foreclose this interpretation. Chevron,467 U.S.
at 843; Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 218.
The "Clear Statement" Rule Does Not Apply
to Regulationof the Practice of Medicine
The Court of Appeals avoided this analysis by
holding that the Attomey General’s directive
on
prescriptions for assisted suicide "interferes with Oregon’s
authority to regulate medical care within its borders..."
Oregonv. Ashcrofi, 368 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
Relying on Gregory v. Ashcrofi, 501 U.S. 452 (1990), the
Appeals Court held the AttomeyGeneral had infringed on an
area of law "traditionally reservedfor state authority, such as
regulation of medical care." Id. at 1125. Thus, the Court of
Appeals turned the usual test for deference to agency
interpretations of federal law on its head: Congresshad to
makea "clear statement" that it was prohibiting assisted
suicide to authorize the Attorney General to act. Becauseit
had not, the Appeals Court held, the Attorney General’s
ruling wasinvalid. Id. at 1125-26.
Under Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the "clear statement rule"
applied only when"an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokesthe outer limits of Congress’power..." Id. at
172. It is clear that prohibiting prescriptions madefor the
purpose of assisted suicide does not place the Controlled
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Substances Act outside the boundaries
of Congress’
Constitutional
authority.
Congress has always had the
power, under the CommerceClause, to regulate medication
prescribed by doctors. See Minor v. United States, 396 U.S.
87, 98 n.13 (1969); Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507,
511 (1960); In re Grand dury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164,
1169 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Commerce Clause empowers
the federal government to regulate prescription drugs").
Indeed, given the magnitude of the discrimination posed by
Oregon’s assisted suicide law, Amici here submit that the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Commerce Clause,
provides a basis for the Attorney General’s interpretive
ruling. Cf Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 124 S. Ct.
1978, 1989-93 (2004); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461
(striking down, on rational-basis grounds, law that prohibited
homefor people with disabilities).
The Appeals Court’s underlying reasoning that
regulation of the practice of medical infringes upon "a
decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity,"
as establishing qualifications for state judges was held to be
in Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, is patently flawed. There is no
support, legal or otherwise,
for the Appeals Court’s
conclusion that regulating the practice of medicine "go[es] to
the heart of representative government." Id. at 461 (quoting
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). See e.g.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Massachusetts,
987 F.2d 64, 67 (lst Cir. 1993) (distinguishing
Gregory
because "[t]he Missouri constitutional
provision was
concerned, not with regulating health care, but with ensuring
the qualifications of the highest state officials.") (emphasis
added).
If any federal restriction on the practice of medicine
infringed upon a "fundamental" state function, it would call
into question Congress’ entire regulatory
scheme for
prescription medication, which has been in effect for three
decades and has been repeatedly upheld and enforced. See
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Moore,423 U.S. at 139. Indeed, it is difficult to understand
howthe practice of medicine could be considered solely a
state function, given that the federal government has
regulated in this area for at least the past 67 years. See e.g.
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397.
The Court of Appeal’s holding is of significant
concernto amici beyondits implications for assisted suicide.
Congressand federal agencies often regulate "medical care"
to prevent abuse of or discrimination against people with
disabilities. If every decision affecting the medicalpractice
were within a state’s sovereign power and subject to the
"clear statement" rule, Congress’ability to prohibit states
from sanctioning disability discrimination in the medical
field wouldbe severely undermined.
For example, in Olmstead, this Court held that the
unnecessaryinstitutionalization of people with disabilities by
states was discrimination under Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).AlthoughTitle II’s definition
of discrimination did not explicitly identify unnecessary
institutionalization,
the Court relied in part upon the
Attorney General’s regulations and interpretations of the Act
in discerning Congress’ intent. 527 U.S. at 598. Although
this interfered with a "medical" decision approved under
state law (and carried out by the State itself), it was
nevertheless understoodas appropriate federal action. Id. ]5
Similarly, in Bragdon,this Court ruled that a patient
with HIV could bring a claim under Title III of the ADA
against a dentist whorefused to serve him because of his
disability. 524 U.S. at 647. The Court relied on agency
determinations that Congress had intended to cover persons
15 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985),
while involving the rights of institutionalized people with disabilities, is
distinguishable because it involved a state’s waiver of sovereign
immunityunder the Eleventh Amendment,not the underlying challenged
practices in the institution, ld. at 242.
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with HIV under Title III, which applied to medical
practitioners. Althoughthis decision involved Congressional
regulation of the practice of dentistry, this Court did not
invoke the "clear statement" rule or find that Title III
encroachedupona "fundamental"state function. Id. at 642.16
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully urge
this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision and
affirm the AttorneyGeneral’sinterpretive ruling.
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16 In the District Court below, the defendant dentist challenged
application of Title III to him on grounds that "the practice of dental
medicine is an area of law reserved to the states, and thus beyond the
scope of Congress’ CommerceClause authority." Abbott v. Bragdon,
912 F. Supp. 580, 592 (D. Me. 1995), affd,, 107 F.3d 934 (lst Cir.
1997), vacated &remandedon other grounds, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). The
Court rejected this proposition and held Congress could regulate
defendant’s dental practice because it was "an economicenterprise", ld.
at 593-94&n. 15.

